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Abstract: The fourth industrial revolution, resulting in Industry 4.0, provides a variety of novel business cases. 
These business cases provide benefits with respect to cost, effort, customer satisfaction and production time. 
Progress in production can be monitored in real-time by the customer, maintenance can be performed in a 
remote fashion, time- and cost-efficient production of customer specific products is enabled. These business 
cases are founded on characteristics of digitisation, namely an increase in intercommunication and embedded 
computational capacities. Besides the advantages derived from the ever present communication properties, it 
increases the attack surface of a network as well. As industrial protocols and systems were not designed with 
security in mind, spectacular attacks on industrial systems occurred over the last years. Most industrial 
communication protocols do not provide means to ensure authentication or encryption. This means attackers 
with access to a network can read and write information. Originally not meant to be connected to public 
networks, the use cases of Industry 4.0 require interconnectivity, often through insecure public networks. This 
lead to an increasing interest in information security products for industrial applications. In this work, the 
concept for holistic intrusion detection methods in an industrial context is presented. It is based on different 
works considering several aspects of industrial environments and their capabilities to identify intrusions as an 
anomaly in network or process data. These capabilities are based on preceding experiments on real and 
synthetic data. In order to justify the concept, an overview of potential and actual attack vectors and attacks on 
industrial systems is provided. It is shown that different aspects of industrial facilities, e.g. office IT, shop floor 
OT, firewalled connections to customers and partners are analysed as well as the different layers of the 
automation pyramid require different methods to detect attacks. Additionally, the singular steps of an attack on 
industrial applications are characterised. Finally, a resulting concept for integration of these methods is 
proposed, providing the means to detect the different stages of an attack by different means 
 
Keywords: Industrial (Information) Security, Intrusion Detection, Attack Vectors, Hybrid Approach, Machine 
Learning 
1. Introduction 
The fourth digital revolution, creating Industry 4.0, enables a plethora of novel use and business cases for 
industrial applications. Founded on the development in communication and computation technology, the 
Industry 4.0 use cases employ the increase of intercommunication and embedded intelligence, e.g. the digital 
factory (Stef et al. 2013). These novel business cases can decrease cost, time to production and effort. They 
enable customer individual production, direct information about the state of production, remote maintenance 
and operation. Since they rely heavily on communication, connection through network boundaries is essential. 
However, industrial communication protocols have not been designed with security in mind. Most protocols, 
such as Modbus (Modbus 2012; Modbus-IDA 2006) or Profinet (PROFIBUS 2017) do not contain methods to 
authenticate entities or encrypt communication. Originally, industrial control systems, commonly known as 
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) or Operation Technology (OT)–Systems were meant to be 
physically separated from public networks. Additionally, highly application specific devices and configurations 
were considered to make it exceedingly difficult for an attacker to exploit the systems (Igure et al. 2006). These 
assumptions, however, have proven to be wrong. A spectacular series of successful attacks on industrial 
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companies and systems shows that industry has become a target of cyber criminals and state-sponsored actors 
alike (Duque Anton et al. 2017a). Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS)–products make integration and configuration 
of new devices easier for operators. On the other hand, they allow attackers to analyse and develop exploits 
against the devices. Furthermore, the network layout of industry is based on well-established protocols and 
network segmentation techniques. The application of common techniques makes it easy for attackers to reuse 
attack techniques. The incentive for attackers is manifold. Attacks on industrial and critical infrastructure 
facilities can originate in a political agenda, even though attribution is difficult. Different industrial attacks in the 
past, e.g. the Ukrainian blackout in December 2015 and Stuxnet, are rumoured to be part of a political plan. 
Additionally, cybercrime has become a profitable business. In 2015, the revenue of cyber attacks has surpassed 
the global profit in drug trafficking for the first time (Leyden 2018). The potential of cybercrime in industry, e.g. 
by sabotage and espionage, is deemed high. 
 
Industrial applications are characterised by unique properties. They commonly contain a network segment of 
classic office Information Technology (IT) that is used for communication with customers and partners as well 
as raw material and product configuration, so-called Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and Manufacturing 
Execution Systems (MESs). Additionally, there is an OT network segment used for control of the production 
machines. The networks are usually separated by data diodes or De-Militarized Zones (DMZs). Cyber attacks aim 
on both of these network segments, depending on their goal. However, these kinds of networks are vastly 
different in terms of connected devices, protocol and usage behaviour. Thus, detecting and preventing attacks 
on industrial facilities is strongly application- and attack-specific. A thorough understanding of the domain and 
possible attacks is required, as well as an understanding of promising methods to detect attacks in the individual 
domains. In this work, an overview of possible attacks on industry is provided, including original vectors and 
methods for lateral movement. Based on this, promising intrusion detection methods are proposed. Their 
applicability is derived from prior experiments. Due to the specific nature of industrial environments, different 
parts of the network and different attack vectors need different methods to detect them. Thus, the concept for 
a hybrid model integrating different methods required for detecting typical attacks along their path is proposed. 
 
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. In Section 2, an overview of related work is provided. A 
discussion of attacks on industrial systems can be found in Section 3. Approaches to detect such attacks at 
different points of the system are introduced in Section 4. A hybrid industrial intrusion detection approach, 
consisting of a combination of the introduced methods, is presented in Section 5. This work closes with a 
discussion provided in Section 6. 
2. Related Work 
In this section, works addressing attacks on industrial settings are discussed at first. After that, works discussing 
industrial intrusion detection are presented and categorised according to aim and method of detection. 
 
There is a variety of scientific discussions on risks and threats in SCADA-systems, e.g. Zhu et al. (2011) and (Igure 
et al. 2006). In their work, they discuss the inherent weaknesses of SCADA systems, such as lack in authentication 
and encryption. Virvillis and Gritzalis address the effects of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) on industry using 
the examples of four widely discussed industrial malwares: Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame and Red Ocotber (Virvilis and 
Gritzalis 2013). Positive Technologies provide an exhaustive analysis of the state of industrial and corporate 
network security as well as risks and threats on industry (Positive Technologies 2018). Additionally, the individual 
attacks have been discussed: Langner provides a thorough analysis of the Stuxnet attacks (Langner 2013). 
Lindsay discusses Stuxnet while putting it in the context of cyber warfare and describing its limits (Lindsay 2013). 
Lee et al, Cherepanov and Dragos discuss the industrial malware Industroyer, also known as Crashoverride (Lee 
et al. 2016; Cherepanov 2017; Dragos 2016). It is responsible for the successful attacks on the Ukrainian power 
grid in December 2015. Shamir analyses a new version of BlackEnergy that is linked to cyber attacks on the 
Ukrainian government as well as the aforementioned blackouts (Shamir 2016). 
 
In order to address these issues and to protect industrial networks from attacks, a variety of research has been 
conducted. Due to their periodic, repetitive nature, state information can be used to detect anomalies. This is 
done by Khalili and Sami (2015). Caselli et al. focus on sequences in a way that intrusion detection systems are 
able to understand the step in a process chain they are currently in (Caselli et al. 2015). Thus, attacks based on 
reaching unwanted, but generally allowed states, can be detected. The same approach is chosen by Fovino et al. 
with a focus on Modbus and DNP3 (Fovino et al. 2010). The determinism found in industrial applications is made 
 
 
use of by Hadeli et al. (Hadeli et al.). A similar approach is chosen by Morris et al., they present a system that 
can be used to detect anomalies in Modbus RTU and ASCII-systems in a retrofit fashion (Morris et al. 2012). Gao 
and Morris discuss potential attacks on industrial systems and intrusion detection-based countermeasures for 
Modbus-based communication (Gao and Morris 2014). Ponomarev and Atkison made use of telemetry 
information to obtain insights about threats and attacks (Ponomarev and Atkison 2016). 
 
The increase in computational power allows more complex algorithms, such as methods of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) or Machine Learning (ML), to work in a time-efficient manner. An overview of the challenges is provided by 
Mantere et al. (2012). Borges Hink et al. aim at differentiating between disturbances based on natural deviations 
and attacks in power grids in order to support human decision making (Borges Hink et al.). Beaver et al. evaluate 
ML-based methods for detecting malicious SCADA communication (Beaver et al. 2013). Furthermore, One-Class 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) as well as Ant Colony Optimisation are used to detect anomalies in industrial 
networks (Shang et al. 2015; Tsang and Kwong). 
 
Wireless technologies are getting used in an increasing fashion for industrial applications. They are easy and 
quick in set up and operation. This motivates research on securing wireless channels, e.g. Mobile Ad hoc 
NETworks (MANETs) (Shakshuki et al. 2013), Wireless Sensor Networks (Shin et al. 2010) and wireless industrial 
networks (Wei and Kim 2012). 
3. Attacks on Industry – An Overview 
Attacks on industrial environments are different from attacks on classic home- and office-IT systems. Industrial 
companies employ IT as well as OT networks. An exemplary network structure found in industrial environments 
is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Typical Structure of Industrial Networks 
 
It can be seen that an office-IT network is connected to the public Internet. This is used for customer contact, 
company representation and other tasks. However, this network is also used for configuration, creation and 
modification of OT-level applications, e.g. code for Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). If an attacker aims at 
sabotaging applications, this is the point to execute the payload. If the network where a PLC control is created 
is connected to a public network, no air gap is in action, allowing for an attacker to compromise OT devices as 
soon as the IT-perimeter is broken. According to Positive Technologies, an attacker could have penetrated the 
network and accessed the corporate information system in 73 % of the cases they evaluated (Positive 
Technologies 2018). Many attacks on industrial applications were possible due to phishing, an exemplary set of 
attacks is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of Industrial Phishing Attacks 
Operation Aurora targeted Google and other software companies (McClure et al. 2010). Night Dragon, Greek Oil 
and New Year’s campaign targeted the energy sector, especially petrol processing facilities (Wueest 2014), while 
Nitro targeted chemical processing facilities (Chien and O’Gorman 2011). Black Vine targeted aerospace and 
healthcare companies (DiMaggio 2015). Dragonfly (Symantec Corporation 2014) and Black Energy were 
specifically aimed at Industrial Control Systems (ICSs), with Black Energy (Lee et al. 2016) being linked to the 
Ukrainian power grid failure in December 2015. The Unnamed campaign was used to extract information from 
ICS systems, making it a corporate espionage tool (Kaspersky Lab 2017). 
 
Apart from spear phishing, any means to break the perimeter allows an attacker leverage to move laterally inside 
the network. USB flash drive- or SD memory card-based attacks for bridging air gaps have been established, e.g. 
by the Stuxnet attack (Langner 2013). Detecting attacks once the malware has moved to the OT is difficult for 
several reasons, they are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of IT and OT 
Property IT OT 
Operation times Commonly around 3 to 5 years 2 to 4 decades 
Cost of interruption Medium High, hundreds of thousands per 
hour 
Placement & Management Central, in similar location Spatially distributed 
Upgrade capabilities Upgrades possible Upgrades difficult 
Software properties Similar, compatible solutions Proprietary, vendor-specific 
solutions 
Cost Moderate High 
Effects Only digital domain Physical world 
 
This table shows the difficulty in securing industrial facilities. Their cost and operation time makes add-on 
solutions for security necessary. However, they need to cope with difficulties to be distributed and upgraded 
due to software management and distribution of machines. Furthermore, a plethora of proprietary protocols 
needs to be addressed while downtimes are not acceptable. 
4. Industrial Intrusion Detection Approaches 
A generic example of a typical industrial network structure was presented in Section 3, pictured in Figure 1. This 
structure indicates possible places in the system to detect attacks at different stages. In this section, all of those 
places are discussed. At first, detection is possible when the outer perimeter is broken. After that, lateral 
movement within the industrial IT network is the goal. Once the malware reached the OT network, it can be 
detected either by suspicious network traffic or by anomalous process behaviour. 
4.1 Detecting Perimeter Breaks 
The task to detect breaches of the perimeter is located in the area of classical IT security, it is not in the scope 
of this work. It should be noted, however, that the human factor is considered to be the most significant risk 
with respect to breaches of the perimeter. Phishing and other forms of social engineering have proven to create 
a significant effect on employees. If a single employee falls for a scam e-mail, attackers can obtain a foothold 
within the network. For tricking certain, usually high privileged, employees, more targeted methods, such as 
spear phishing with plausible information or water holing attacks, offer promising results. Unfortunately, 
technical means can only provide a minor amount of protection against social engineering. Awareness and 
 
 
training of responsible personnel is necessary, in combination with a sound but useable security concept 
(Surveillance Self-Defense 2018). 
4.2 Detecting Lateral Movement 
Similar to the detection of perimeter breaches, lateral movement in the IT-network need to be detected by well-
established IT-security tools, such as Network- and Host-based Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 
(NIDS, HIDS, NIPS, HIPS). Such tools, e.g. firewalls, detect and mitigate the propagation of malware, often with 
the aid of sophisticated heuristics or Deep Packet Investigation (DPI). Furthermore, the usage of Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems can be useful for detecting attacks. Such systems, e.g. 
Splunk (2019) often provide means for the integration of process and OT data as well, allowing industrial IT-
security personnel to obtain holistic information about the security status of a network or system. 
4.3 Detecting Suspicious OT Traffic 
In contrast to IT-networks, traffic in OT-networks is usually using proprietary protocols that do not consider 
security objectives. However, the traffic is much more periodic and repetitive than in IT networks. This property 
can be used to detect attacks in forms of anomalies. Most commercial industrial intrusion detection systems 
employ a baselining-algorithm that monitors the network for a certain amount of time as a training. After that, 
deviations from the baseline are flagged as anomalous. Additionally, scientific approaches have been evaluated 
in order to find anomalies. Matrix Profiles, as presented by Yeh et al. (2016), have proven to be efficient in 
detecting anomalies in OT-network traffic (Duque Anton et al. 2018a). This property is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Example of Matrix Profiles to Detect Malicious OT traffic 
 
Matrix Profiles are calculated based on a distance metric, e.g. the z-Normlized Euclidean distance as follows: 
𝑑(?̂?, ?̂?) =  √2𝑚(1 −  
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑚𝜇𝑥𝜇𝑦
𝑚𝜎𝑥𝜎𝑦
) 
 The black dots indicate the attacks, the grey line indicates the minimal distance, and the black line indicates the 
minimum threshold recognising all attacks. Matrix Profiles are a windowed approach where for each sequence 
of length m the minimal distance to all other sequences of length m is calculated. M is the only hyper parameter 
that needs to be set by the user. Furthermore, Matrix Profiles do not need training as such, as they are applied 
directly to the data. If the minimal distance of a given sequence to all other sequences is small, it is a common 
motif, meaning it occurs often, indicating normal behaviour. If the minimal distance is high, however, the motif 
is a singularity which indicates an outlier as well as a potential attack. The evaluation in Figure 3 is based on an 
industrial data set introduced by Lemay and Fernandez (2016). They created an emulation of an electric circuit 
breaker system communicating via Modbus, consisting of three to twelve Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and one 
 
 
to two Master Terminal Units (MTUs). In doing so, several data sets were monitored, some containing simulated 
human interaction as well as periodic polling. After that, different kinds of attacks were introduced to a set of 
the data sets. The attacks are based on TCP/IP, e.g. scanning the network, extracting information or uploading 
malicious files. The data set under analysis is called “CnC_uploading_exe_modbus_6RTU_with_operate”. As 
features, the numbers of packets, IP- and port-pairs were used. They provide valid indicators of intrusions. 
 
In addition to the time series analysis of the OT network traffic, packet-based analysis can be used to produce 
promising results as well. Random Forests, Support Vector Machines (SVM), k-means clustering and k nearest 
neighbours have been evaluated on three of the data sets provided by Lemay and Fernandez (Duque Anton et 
al. 2018c). Since SVM and Random Forests provide promising results, the application of both of them on the data 
sets “Moving_two_files_Modbus_6RTU” (DS1), “Send_a_fake_command_Modbus_6RTU_with_operate” (DS2) 
and a combination of data sets with and without attacks (DS3). This shows packet-based analysis is a promising 
approach as well. The concepts of SVM and Random Forest are shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Random Forest and SVM 
 
Random Forests consist of a group of decision trees of which the majority decision is used as the classification. 
SVM is a large-margin classifier, it aims at separating clusters such that the distance of each entity from the 
separator is maximal. 
 
Table 2: Performance of SVM and Random Forest on OT Network Traffic 
 SVM Random Forest 
Data Set F1-score Accuracy F1-score Accuracy 
DS1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DS2 1.0 1.0 0.999851 0.999701 
DS3 0.999968 0.999936 0.999986 0.999973 
 
4.4 Detecting Suspicious Process Behaviour 
In addition to meta-information, time series approaches such as Matrix Profiles, can also be applied to process 
information, as shown in Figure 5. In the first and third line, the water flow and water tank level of an industrial 
batch process are shown, as explained in (Duque Anton et al. 2019b) and (Duque Anton et al. 2019a). The second 
and fourth row describe the according minimal distance. Attacks are introduced at a packet count of 4,000 and 
6,500 as analysed and explained by (Duque Anton et al. 2019b). This corresponds to the notable increases in 
minimal distance, successfully detecting the disruptions of the process as an anomaly. 
 
 
5. A Hybrid Concept for Industrial Intrusion Detection 
In order to detect the attacks as described in Section 3 as thoroughly as possible, the methods presented in 
Section 4 need to be combined in an intelligent matter. On the one hand, strong IT-security is required to detect 
and mitigate intrusions in and lateral movement through the IT network. Additionally, a combination of OT-
network and process-based intrusion detection can be used to detect and attribute attacks. If host-based 
information, e.g. from HMIs, is combined with OT-network data, a dashboard as exemplarily shown in Figure 6 
can aid a human operator in detecting attacks, obtaining an overview of the network state and being able to 
place attacks at their points of origin and destination, thus helping to provide efficient Incident Response (IR). 
Especially in the OT-domain, time series-based anomaly detection has shown potential, making it a plausible 
candidate for an intrusion detection mechanism (Duque Anton et al. 2018a). 
 
 
Figure 5: Example of Matrix Profiles to Detect Malicious Process Behaviour 
 
 
Figure 6: Concept for a Hybrid Industrial IDS 
 
Combining IT-, OT- and process information has the potential to detect attacks during at least one stage. First, 
the IT-network has to be breached and traversed. If this happens successfully, OT- or process information can 
still be used to detect artefacts or effects of an attack, thus increasing the probability of noting an attack. 
 
Additionally to the singular information sources, combining information sources and considering contextual 
information can provide crucial insights into the security status (Duque Anton et al. 2017b; Duque Anton et al. 
2018b). 
 
 
6. Conclusion and Outlook 
In this work, an overview of industrial attack vectors was provided. The stages an attacker needs to overcome 
in order to successfully penetrate an industrial network, i.e. breaking the perimeter, moving laterally, exploiting 
industrial hardware, executing the attack, becoming permanent, have been discussed. After that, possible places 
in the networks commonly found in an industrial environment are presented. It shows that time series are 
especially promising for the OT and process domain. Finally, the combination of these approaches is expected 
to address an attack throughout the complete attack cycle, providing a holistic view and aiding the detection. 
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